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Background
Pathfinder
Pathfinder Plus
Centurion
Helios Prototype HP01 (High-Altitude Configuration)
Helios Prototype HP03 (Long-Endurance Configuration)
Evolution from the Pathfinder 
to the Helios
1981 - 1997
1998 - 2002
 
1998
  
1999 - 2001
2003
Helios Prototype HP01 and HP03
•  1996: ERAST plans to build two flying vehicles
-  “Centurion” - high-altitude solar powered mission
-  “Helios” - long-endurance fuel cell/solar powered mission
•  1998: Development of Regenerative Fuel Cell System (RFCS) begins
•  1999: Under the constraint of a reduced budget, NASA and AV agree to
    build one airframe to demonstrate both ERAST missions
•  “Centurion” is modified and renamed “Helios Prototype”
•  2001: NASA and AV agree to use consumable hydrogen-air Primary
   Fuel Cell System (PFCS) because of RFCS operational difficulties
   and schedules
•  “Helios Prototype HP01” is modified for the PFCS and becomes the
   “Helios Prototype HP03”
On August 13, 2001 “Helios Prototype HP01”
reaches an altitude of 96,863 feet,
a world record for sustained horizontal flight by a winged aircraft
Helios Prototype HP01
High-Altitude Configuration
Evolution of the 
Long-Endurance Configuration
Helios Prototype (HP01) 
with planned
regenerative fuel cell system
Helios Prototype (HP03)
with hydrogen - air
fuel cell system
(3 point masses)
Helios Prototype (HP01)
spanloader configuration
Total Weight - 1585 lbs
247 feet
212 lbs 212 lbs
Estimated
 Total Weight - 1810 lbs 
520 lbs165 lbs 165 lbs
Total Weight - 2320 lbs
Helios Prototype HP03 
Long-Endurance Configuration
•  Wing span 247 feet
•  Wing chord – 8 feet
•  Aspect Rati0 – 31
•  10 2-HP (1.5 kw) motors
•  79 inch diameter propellers
•  72 trailing edge elevators
•  Composite wing spar and ribs
•  Wing wrapped with transparent
    plastic skin
•  Aerodynamically shaped foam
   leading edge
•  6 41-foot wing panels
•  No wing taper or sweep
•  Maximum chord thickness – 11.5 inches
•  10 degree up sweep on outer wing panel
Helios Prototype HP03
1st Two Flights in 2003
Straight - line flight, May 15, 2003 
HP03 flown 2 feet above runway for 10 Sec
1st High-altitude flight (HP03-1), June 7,
2003
Test Objectives: 
• Verify the proper wing dihedral 
   distribution 
• Check preflight assembly and test 
    procedures
    
Test Objectives:
• Demonstrate the readiness of the aircraft
systems, flight support equipment and
instrumentation, and flight procedures
• Validate the handling and aeroelastic
stability of the aircraft
• Demonstrate the operation of the fuel cell
system
• Provide training for personnel to staff future
multi-day flights
Description of Mishap
Turbulence Shear Line Observations
Northern wind 
shear line
Southern wind
shear line
Helicopter 
observed wind 
shear lines
HP03-2 flight path
with wind speed 
and direction
HP03-2 on take-off
HP03-2 with normal wing dihedral HP03-2 with persistent high wing dihedral
Photos Taken of HP03-2
June 26, 2003
Description of Mishap
•  On June 26, 2003 at approximately 10:35am at an altitude of about 2,800
   feet, HP03-2 encountered turbulence associated with wind shear lines
   around the island of Kauai
•  Turbulence initiated a persistent high wing dihedral causing an unstable
   pitch oscillation
•  Airspeed excursions were around ± 2 ft/sec; main wing spar strain gauge
   reading 103% of limit load
•  Following pilot procedures to reduce dihedral, wing dihedral decreased
   slightly, but then grew to over 30 feet
•  Large airspeed fluctuations of about ± 10 ft/sec now observed, an indication
   the aircraft was experiencing large pitching motions
•  Airspeed excursions began to double every cycle
Description of Mishap (Cont’d)
•  Vehicle became oriented at extreme attitudes relative to the air stream 
    (wing dihedral of about 40 feet with the airspeed nearing 90 ft/sec)
•  High dynamic loads broke the right wing leading edge foam secondary 
    structure near the hydrogen fuel tanks
 
•  Solar cells and the wing skin began to rip off the upper surface of the wing 
    resulting in loss of lift
•  Vehicle entered a more severe attitude resulting in additional secondary 
    structural failure
•  Aircraft continued to come apart as it fell to the Pacific Ocean
Photos Taken of HP03-2 
Following Mishap
Falling to the Pacific Helios upon impact with the ocean
Surveillance of debris Close-up of floating debris
HP03-2 Time History 
from Take-Off to Mishap 
Airspeed, 
ft/sec
Wing
dihedral, 
ft
Pitch rate, 
deg/sec
Observations Concerning 
Mishap and Analysis Results
Surprises to Crew
•  Strength of dihedral response to mild turbulence
•  High persistent dihedral
•  Wing not robust to returning to low dihedral
•  Rapid divergence of pitch instability
  
Increased Sensitivity to Small Gusts
Variation of Spanwise 
Lift Distribution with Gust Velocity
Spanwise Lift Distribution for 
Various Wing Dihedral
Proximate and Root Causes
Proximate Cause
Proximate Cause Definition
The event that occurred, including any condition that existed immediately
before the undesired outcome, that directly resulted in its occurrence
and, if eliminated or modified, would have prevented the undesired
Outcome.
The proximate cause for the loss of the HP03-2 was the high dynamic 
pressure reached by the aircraft during the last cycle of the unstable 
pitch oscillation leading to failure of the vehicle’s secondary structure.
Root Causes
1) Lack of adequate analysis methods led to an inaccurate risk assessment of
      the effects of the configuration changes
2) Configuration changes to the aircraft, altered the aircraft from a spanloader
       to a highly point-loaded mass distribution on the same structure
significantly reducing design robustness and margins of safety
Root Cause Definition
One of multiple factors (events, conditions, or organizational factors) that
contributed to or created the proximate cause and subsequent undesired
outcome and, if eliminated, or modified, would have prevented the
undesired outcome.
Technical Recommendations
and Lessons Learned
Technical Recommendations
•  Develop more advanced, multidisciplinary (structures, aeroelastic,
   aerodynamics, atmospheric, materials, propulsion, controls, etc) “time-domain”
   analysis methods appropriate to highly flexible, “morphing” vehicles
•  Develop ground-test procedures and techniques appropriate to this class of
   vehicle to validate new analysis methods and predictions
•  Develop multidisciplinary (structures, aerodynamic, controls, etc) models,
   which can describe the nonlinear dynamic behavior of aircraft modifications
•  Provide for more incremental flight-testing when large configuration changes
   significantly deviate from the initial design concept
•  Implement mitigations or hardware systems for returning a vehicle back
   into a safe flight envelope
Technical Recommendations (Cont’d)
•  Develop a method to measure wing dihedral in real-time
•  Develop manual and/or automatic techniques to control wing dihedral in
   flight
•  Develop capability to perform simulations of the vehicle’s response to
   disturbances
•  Apply advanced atmospheric models that better predict conditions hazardous
   to this class of vehicle
Lessons Learned
•  Including large point masses on this type of airframe should not be attempted
   without optimizing the design of the primary load carrying structure
•  Measurement of wing dihedral in real-time is necessary with visual displays
•  Procedure to control wing dihedral in flight is necessary
•  Time domain design and analysis tools for examining the effects of
   disturbances on the behavior of highly flexible vehicles are a necessity
•  Model fidelity/validation and time domain simulation, can significantly reduce
    technical risk where the complexity and nonlinear interaction is significant
•  Using numerical simulation models, useful meteorological information can be
    obtained that highlights the regional weather peculiarities
•  Design and analysis tools applicable to large, lightweight flexible wing aircraft
   require better space-time domain models of atmospheric disturbances
Summary
Summary Comments
•  Instability associated with the Helios Prototype HP03-2 vehicle was a
   nonlinear stability and control problem involving complex interactions
   among the flexible structure, the unsteady aerodynamics, the flight control
   system, the environmental conditions, and vehicle flight dynamics
•  Analysis tools and solution techniques were constrained by conventional
   and segmented linear methodologies that did not provide the proper level
   of complexity to understand the technology interactions on the vehicle’s
   stability and control characteristics
•  More advanced, multidisciplinary (structures, aeroelastic, aerodynamics,
   atmospheric, materials, propulsion, controls, etc) “time-domain” analysis
   methods appropriate to highly flexible, “morphing” vehicles are required
•  Ground-test procedures and techniques appropriate to this class of vehicle
   are needed to validate new analysis methods and predictions
